

IPv6

Layer3

Mobility & Security

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Data network usage

- Usage patterns of data network mobility
 - ≤ 199x Fixed line usage (PC/Server) Ethernet/Dial-in access
 - 200x Fixed mobile usage (Laptop) Ethernet/Dial-in/WiFi
 - 201x Mobile usage (Smartphones/Tablet) 3G/4G/WiFi
 - ≥ 2015 Mobile network usage (Mobile Router Car/Train/Ship)
- Today, mobility is based on Layer 2 technologies
 - WiFi roaming between access points
 - 3G/4G GTP tunnel to GGSN/PGW
- Issues with layer 2 mobility
 - scaling problems
 - suboptimal traffic flow (3G/4G)
 - no mobility between different access technologies (3G/WiFi) or ISPs
- Why not use layer 3 mobility ?

The Locator / Identifier Problem

IP address is used as Identifier **and** Locator

Identifier part

- OS needs a way to map incoming IP packet to application
- Both peers use 5-tuple as endpoint identifier

```
$ netstat -n -t
Proto Recv-Q Send-Q Local Address           Foreign Address         State
tcp        0      0 88.198.13.165:43162     74.125.39.125:5269     ESTABLISHED
tcp6       0  10920 2a01:4f8:130:1261::5222 2a00:0:1801:1:216::7744 ESTABLISHED
```

- The application associated with the tuple is shown by `netstat -p`

```
# netstat -t -A inet6 -p
Active Internet connections (w/o servers)
Proto Recv-Q Send-Q Local Address           Foreign Address         State       PID/Program name
tcp6   0    10920 2a01:4f8:130:12:5222 2a00:0:1801:12:7744 ESTABLISHED 16450/c2s
```

- If IP address or port is changed, session is stalled
That's only one reason why NAT (NAPT) is evil (just like stateful firewalls)
- L3 mobility issue: IP address prefix depends on subnet

The Locator / Identifier Problem

IP address is used as Identifier **and** Locator

Locator part

- For scalability reasons IP addresses are aggregated
Nevertheless the IPv4 full table has about 500,000 prefixes
- Address aggregation is more efficient in IPv6
Just because of huge address space
 - All customers of one ISP using the same prefix
DTAG 2003::/19, VF 2a00::/22
 - Customer of the same region (pop) are using the same prefix
e.g. out of one /32
 - All subnets of one customer site are using the same prefix
Out of the same /48
- Change of subnet/pop/ISP means change of IP address also
All active sessions get stuck

Layer 3 mobility solutions

Requirements

- Roaming across different access technologies
WiFi, WiMAX, UMTS, LTE, fixed
- Seamless handover between layer 3 networks
- Application continuity
Session persistence
- Reachability of mobile nodes
Even if they are not connected to the home network
- Mobility of both endpoints


Implementations

- MIP6 Mobile IPv6
- HIP Host Identity Protocol
- And others ...

MIPv6 Definition and Terminology


- IPv6 Mobility basics
 - RFC3775/RFC6275: Mobility Support in IPv6 (June 2004 / July 2011)
 - RFC3776: Using IPsec to Protect Mobile IPv6 Signaling between Mobile Nodes and Home Agents (Updated by 4877)
- Mobile Node (MN)
- Home Address (HoA)
A (static) IP address out of the mobile nodes home network
- Care of Address (CoA)
The physical IP address of a MN while visiting a foreign network
- Home Agent (HA)
A router on the home network which represents the MN
- Correspondent Node (CN)
A peer node with which a MN is communicating (mobile or stationary)
- Binding
Association of the home address with the care-of address of a MN

Bidirectional Tunnel Mode (1)




- MN connects to foreign network and gets a CoA
- MN sends **binding update** to HA
Should be secured by IPsec ESP in transport mode
- HA uses proxy neighbor discovery (IPv6 equivalent of proxy ARP) to represent the MN in the home network
- All traffic destined to the MN will be encapsulated in a IPv6-in-IPv6 Tunnel and sent to the CoA of the MN

Bidirectional Tunnel Mode (2)




- Traffic from the MN uses the same tunnel in reverse mode
- Results in suboptimal routing, especially if both peers are far away from the home network
- Only HA and MN have to do some special packet handling
MIPv6 is completely transparent for CN

Triangle Routing ?




- Traffic from MN is directly sent to CN
- MIPv4 solution
- Problem: Outgoing traffic can't use the HoA as source address
Anti-spoofing ACLs at the foreign network usually prevent this
- Suboptimal routing anyway
- MIPv6 Solution: Route Optimization

Route optimization (1)




- MN sends binding update to CN
- MN sends traffic to CN with CoA as source address
This is to bypass the anti spoofing ACLs at the foreign network
- Packet contains an HoA destination option
- CN replaces the source address with the home address before passing the packet to upper layer protocols

Route optimization (2)




- CN sends traffic to MN with CoA as destination address
- Packet contains a special Routing Header with HoA as second hop
- MN removes the routing header and „forwards“ the packet to the next hop specified by the routing header
- Upper layer protocol is only aware of HoA
- But: Binding update **must** be secured

Secure Binding



- Trust relationship between MN and HA
IPsec with ESP in transport mode must be used for binding update message
- No trust relation between MN and CN
Return Routeability mechanism used to prove the reachability of MN


Return Routeability Procedure (1)



- MN sends two messages with a cookie to CN
 - Home Test init (HTi) is sent via HA
(traffic to HA must be encrypted)
 - Care-of Test init (CTi) is sent directly to CN
- CN uses pre-generated key and nonce to build two keygen tokens
(Key: random number of 20 octets; Nonce: random octet string of any length)

```
home keygentok := FIRST (64, HMAC_SHA1 (key, (HoA | nonce | "0")))
care-of keygentok := FIRST (64, HMAC_SHA1 (key, (CoA | nonce | "1")))
```

Return Routeability Procedure (2)



- CN sends keygen tokens and cookies back to MN
Home Test (HT) and Care-of Test (CT) messages
- MN builds binding message key

$$\text{bmKey} := \text{SHA}(\text{home keygen token} \mid \text{care-of keygen token})$$
- MN sends binding update message signed with bmKey
- CN can prove that the MN is reachable via both paths

MIPv6 Summary

- Two IPv6 addresses used to overcome the Locator/Identifier problem
 - Home address is used as identifier
 - Care-of address is used as locator
- Suboptimal traffic flow if CN does not support MIPv6
- Direct communication between MN and CN is possible
Return Routeability procedure used to exchange binding key
- Solves most of the security challenges introduced by mobility
 - IPsec has to be used for traffic through the Home Agent tunnel
 - MIPv6 introduces no new security threats
- Extensions to MIP
 - Network based mobility solutions (Proxy Mobile IPv6) RFC5213
 - Dual stack mobility (RFC5555)
 - Multicast Mobility (Multimob WG)
 - Network Mobility (NEMO) RFC3963

Host Identity Protocol (RFC 5201)


- Yet another locator/identifier split mechanism
- Host based approach
Some others are network based (e.g. LISP+ALT)
- Enables multihoming
- Mobility
IPv4 and IPv6
- Secure communication channel
Simple key exchange protocol for IPsec
- Public key is used as identifier (instead of IP address)
In fact, a hash of the public key is used
- Adds a new namespace
Domain Name (User), HIT (Identifier), { IPv4 address | IPv6 address } (Locator)

Host Identifier and HIT

- A host identifier is the public part of an asymmetric key (RSA or DSA)
 - Size of identifier depends on key length / algorithm
 - Representation depends on key algorithm
 - A generalized presentation would be more handy
- The host identity tag (HIT) is the sha-1 hash of the host identifier
- A HIT is the 128 bit representation of a host identifier
 - Constant length
 - Same size as an IPv6 address
 - Fits in a socket data structure used by the kernel
 - Represented as a (reserved) IPv6 address
Overlay Routable Cryptographic Hash Identifier (ORCHID)
 - The ORCHID prefix is `2001:0010::/28` (RFC4843)
- Legacy applications can use the HIT instead of an IPv6 address !
e.g. `2001:13:10bc:aed3:2a0a:e2f8:a645:6d3c`

HIP Session Setup

- Protocol number 139 is assigned to HIP
- Base exchange
Just 4 packets to initiate a HIP session



- Makes HIP DoS resilient
puzzle question/answer in r1/i2 message
 - Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange
In r1, i2 packets
 - Authentication
In i2, r2 packets
- Extended Exchange for IP address registration/update
For mobile/multihomed hosts
 - The HIP protocol is control plane only
Data plane is IPsec (or SRTP)

HIP and DNS

- HIP can use DNS to map hostnames (FQDN) to a HIP identity
Distributed Hash Tables (DHT) are also supported
- Client queries for HIP record in addition to an A and/or AAAA record
- HIP RR provides three types of information
 - a. The **HIP identity**, which is the public part of an asymmetric key
 - b. The HIT (**host identity tag**), which is a hash of the Hi
 - c. Optional a **rendezvous server** (for mobile hosts)

- Example RR (Mobile Host)

```
xt5.hznet.de.      IN HIP ( 2 2001001310BCAED32A0AE2F8A6456D3C
                AwEAAeAdP1k64050S1AptjbshjL+jTd0yeiQFyVu
                Bblc09JOKdr1/UrF362MCV4c2T7Bo/7rT8HYRhAb2
                iVcvm5Bszy07uKU4fNTfUu8r2Nzti1QK8mk194HFZ
                0IsJmR940MxEXQIO5if2crV/RN2SfinbJUirfRe+H
                bM3BqdHSdGgTl
                max.hznet.de. )
```

- DNSSEC should be used for a secure binding between FQDN and HIT
BTW: The root zone is signed since July 15, 2010 20:50 UTC

HIP and DNS (2)

- HIP Server


```
crossroads.infracorp.net. HIP ( 2 2001001BA9BEC6A634E58361C07FA990
AwEAAcp2OIA68skk+yPtU+UBtvScsntTvknaxXMPmJi
4OG2N+yszHOM/DWN7GyYZDPPsUURYWu6r3u7pzIub7J
rWXDpYeLIcZmr++D0ENKI9nUs1bPdfgeQTgCu00Bf1K
+wRtAxAQaF64rmSP/L666BEZwfTVWYgfiqZrJNcrFwn
hvt5 )
crossroads.infracorp.net. AAAA 2001:708:140:220::7
crossroads.infracorp.net. A 193.167.187.134
```

- HIP Mobile Host

```
$ dig +dnssec +noall +answer +multi hip xt5.hznet.de
xt5.hznet.de. 10800 IN HIP ( 2 2001001310BCAED32A0AE2F8A6456D3C
AwEAAeAdP1k64050S1AptjbsHjL+jTd0yeiQFyVu
Bb1c09JOKdrl/UrF362MCV4c2T7Bo/7rT8HYRhAb
2iVcvm5Bszy07uKU4fNTfUu8r2NztilQK8mk194H
FZ0IsJmR940MxEXQIO5if2crV/RN2SfinbJUirfr
e+HbM3BqdHSdGgTl
max.hznet.de. )
10800 IN RRSIG HIP 5 3 10800 20120514041807 20120414041807 52469
max.hznet.de. 10800 IN A 88.198.13.165
10800 IN RRSIG A 5 3 10800 20120514041807 20120414041807 52469
max.hznet.de. 10800 IN AAAA 2a01:4f8:130:1261::2
10800 IN RRSIG AAAA 5 3 10800 20120514041807 20120414041807 52469
```

HIP Mobility

- Mobile host requires rendezvous server (RVS) for initial reachability
Mobile host register current locator (IP address) at RVS during base exchange
- Rendezvous server name is (optional) part of HIP DNS record
Locator hint
- HIP initiator (client) sends first packet of HIP base exchange to RVS
- RVS forwards the packet to the host (if host is actually registered)



- Mobile Host sends update packet to client if IP address is changed
RVS has to be informed as well
- Similar procedure is used for multihoming

HIP and IPsec ESP

- HIP uses IPsec ESP to carry the data traffic (RFC5202)
 - Pair of SA is bound to Host Identifier; SPI is used as index into SA table
 - No need to transfer the host identifier within each packet
 - Both endpoints have a local database for mapping of SPI to host identifier
- Other mechanism possible but not yet defined
- Only 2 transforms mandatory
AES with SHA-1 and Null encryption
- IP address could be changed during IPsec session (association)
 - HIP UPDATE message to inform peer
 - Rekeying allowed during IP address change
 - Protocol change possible (IPv4 \leftrightarrow IPv6)
- Good for mobility
 - MIPv6 no longer needed
 - Session persistence because IP address is no longer used as identifier

HIP as a key exchange protocol (like IKE)

Limitations

- HIP is used for end to end security so transport mode is used
In fact most implementations use BEET mode (Bound End to End Tunnel)
- Only one SA per host
 - More than one SA possible (e.g. one HI per application) but unusual
 - Not the same granularity as ISAKMP
- No AH, just ESP mode (but with null encryption)

Advantages

- Layer 3 mobility
- No certificates needed
 - HIP uses key as identifier
 - No binding between key and identifier (IP address) necessary
- Only 4 packets required for peer authentication and key exchange
Same as with IKEv2

Documents

HIP References

- 4423 Host Identity Protocol Architecture (May 2006)
- 5201 Host Identity Protocol (April 2008)
- 5202 Using the Encapsulating Security Payload Transport Format with HIP
- 5205 Host Identity Protocol (HIP) Domain Name System (DNS) Extension
- 5206 End-Host Mobility and Multihoming with the Host Identity Protocol
- 4843 Overlay Routable Cryptographic Hash Identifier (ORCHID)
- draft-henderson-hip-vpls
HIP-based Virtual Private LAN Service (HIPLS)

Implementations

InfraHIP / HIPL

Ubuntu, Fedora, CentOS, Android, Maemo, OpenWRT (<http://infrahip.hiit.fi/>)

OpenHIP

Linux / Windows / Mac (<http://www.openhip.org/>)

HIP for FreeBSD

(<http://www.hip4inter.net/>)

Summary

- Two mobility solutions with different focus shown
 - MIPv6: Wide availability, works with any host (OS support)
 - HIP: End to end security and mobility solution
- Host based solution, no network support needed
Except Home Agent in MIPv6
- Some security threats
Most of them are similar to threats w/o mobility
- HIP adds end-to-end protection of the traffic
- Minor privacy issues
Mobile Node is trackable by home agent or rendezvous server
- Anyway, for MIPv6 or HIP to work we need IPv6 capable networks
- So:

Let's start to rollout IPv6

Questions ?

H Z N E T

DNSSEC, IPsec, VoIPsec, XMPPsec, ...

... DKIM, Kerberos, Radius, NTP, DHCP, DNS, ...

... IPv6, Routing, Switching, 802.1x

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